A person's "right to privacy," "right of privacy," "privacy," or "personal privacy," as these terms are used in this chapter, is invaded or violated only if disclosure of information about the person: (1) Would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public. The provisions of this chapter dealing with the right to privacy in certain public records do not create any right of privacy beyond those rights that are specified in this chapter as express exemptions from the public's right to inspect, examine, or copy public records.
[1987 c 403 § 2. Formerly RCW 42.17.255.]
| Intent -- 1987 c 403: "The legislature intends to restore the law relating to the release of public records largely to that which existed prior to the Washington Supreme Court decision in "In Re Rosier," 105 Wn.2d 606 (1986). The intent of this legislation is to make clear that: (1) Absent statutory provisions to the contrary, agencies possessing records should in responding to requests for disclosure not make any distinctions in releasing or not releasing records based upon the identity of the person or agency which requested the records, and (2) agencies having public records should rely only upon statutory exemptions or prohibitions for refusal to provide public records. Further, to avoid unnecessary confusion, "privacy" as used in RCW 42.17.255 is intended to have the same meaning as the definition given that word by the Supreme Court in "Hearst v. Hoppe," 90 Wn.2d 123, 135 (1978)." [1987 c 403 § 1.]|
Severability -- 1987 c 403: "If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [1987 c 403 § 7.]