



**R.R. "Bob" Greive**

R.R. "Bob" Greive began his political career in 1946 at the age of twenty-seven when he won his first election for the state senate. A Democrat from West Seattle representing the Thirty-Fourth District, Greive quickly moved up in his party's leadership ranks. He was an active campaigner and fundraiser for fellow Democrats and ultimately served sixteen years as the Senate majority leader. Greive's attention to detail and dedication to his political goals also made him a master of the redistricting process. Over three decades he served as "Mr. Redistricting" for the Democrats in the Legislature.

Read the full text of an interview with Senator Greive, [R.R. "Bob" Greive: An Oral History](#), on the Oral History Program's Web site.

**Sen. Greive:** Well, we always came out politically. My thought was if we kept the people happy that were sitting in the seats, we'd come out politically. I didn't think we had to go to unusual tricks to eliminate people, or we'd just come out to do this or that.

**Ms. Boswell:** But then when Prince filed his suit, did that stop the negotiation on the Senate side?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, it didn't hurt us; it helped us. But the thing was, see, the only two parties before the court were Prince and Gorton, and the rest of us are excluded, including the AFL-CIO, the Grange, and so forth. Why then, that's what the court hears. Then they make a deal and negotiate a settlement, and that's it. They can negotiate Prince's plan. Prince would be happy with that, and the court would accept it, and it would be redistricted. It was a way to get around us.

**Ms. Boswell:** So, how does the master come in then?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, the master was appointed by the court because we couldn't agree. I kept thinking we could because what they would do is, they'd talk about agreeing, but every time it got close, well, then I'd feel softness on the other side. "Well now, I think I've got a chance," and I got pledges from people saying they would vote for it, but they didn't have nerve enough to vote for it when the time came down to it. Of course, I had accounted for that. I always knew that most of them would be that way. I always figured a few of them might stand up, but they never had nerve enough to stand up against the leadership.

**Ms. Boswell:** So these would be primarily Republicans?

**Sen. Greive:** Primarily Republicans, but then,

the times the Democrats were in control, then I had to contend with Grant and O'Brien, who thought we had given up too much in 1965, although we had done very well politically after that in the elections. I don't know what they were thinking about.

I'm convinced that O'Brien wanted to be the one that protected his people. He had a handful of people that made him Speaker three times, and I don't blame him for that—that's the world. You live in a realistic world when you're trying to put everything together. You can't go design something that won't work. You had to get the votes.

**Ms. Boswell:** But would you still say that you thought your plan was as non-partisan as you could make it?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, I'm not saying non-partisan. It ended up protecting the people in the seats, but I think it was bi-partisan in that both sides could win and have a say in the matter. I'm sure of that because I felt that I couldn't go too far, or else nobody would accept it. If I went outrageously far—well, I didn't try to. In other words, I didn't object when they made a deal for Thomas Swayze so that he could live across the Narrows and have a little strip of land. Why, I figured that he's entitled to it, if that's the way they wanted it. It didn't hurt anything. He was the Speaker of the House after all.

**Ms. Boswell:** So what prompted the courts to finally step in?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, they just dragged it on and on; you couldn't come to a conclusion. I don't blame them, either. I think we could have done it, if the court had told us that we couldn't do anything—like they had before in 1965, that we couldn't pass a piece of legislation, or didn't do anything—I think we'd have agreed. But as long as they let the business keep

flowing along, why then there's always somebody that didn't agree.

**Ms. Boswell:** So, how did the court decide whom they were going to choose then for the master?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, I don't know how they chose Richard Morrill. We all submitted names of people we thought that would be good masters. We submitted Howard McCurdy, for instance, who's a Republican and had been Gorton's assistant before. We submitted a variety of other people—I forget who all they were. I may have it down here, but I think we might have put Borawick in. We put down Ken Gilbert, who, for instance, has been chief elections officer for the state of Washington for twenty some years. He worked for the Secretary of State in the Elections Department. We put him down for somebody we trust, and they submitted their list.

**Ms. Boswell:** They, being the Republicans?

**Sen. Greive:** Yes, the Republicans, and maybe Prince may have submitted some names, too. I don't know.

**Ms. Boswell:** Now, Richard Morrill, who was he? He was from the University of Washington?

**Sen. Greive:** Yes, professor of geography.

**Ms. Boswell:** So, they had him, then, do his own plan?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, the question is, did he? The judges appointed him to do it. There were all kinds of rumors that that the judge had a hand in it, but I don't know.

**Ms. Boswell:** Did each side have to provide

him with all of their materials that they had been working with?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, we made ours available, I'm sure everybody else did if he wanted it. I don't think he was much interested in what we had done or anybody else. I think he wanted to draw his own plan, but his plan was very hard on incumbents, I can tell you that for sure.

**Ms. Boswell:** And how long did it take him to develop it?

**Sen. Greive:** I don't know, it was a matter of weeks—a month or something, a month and a half. He made a lot of technical errors. For one thing, we were given guidelines, and he violated all the guidelines. They let him do it. You're supposed to have a natural border for district; you're supposed to incorporate this and that. And he didn't count all the people; we figured he missed one hundred forty-nine thousand people that should have been counted because there's a little piece here that he'd leave out, and a little piece there he'd leave out. He didn't make it clear where they were supposed to be, but I suppose that's inevitable. When Gorton and I were doing it we did a lot better job because we looked at each other. We knew that if we did something, Gorton was going to look at it, and Gorton knew we were going to look at it, but Morrill didn't have that pressure on him. See, we had what you call peer review when we did something.

**Ms. Boswell:** Right. So, Morrill then revealed his plan, and what happened then?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, it was eventually adopted by the court, and that was it. We appealed, or tried to appeal it, and we couldn't get it. See, this is a special three-judge court, and the only place we could appeal was the Supreme Court

of the United States. It doesn't go through the District Court procedure. Because it was a constitutional matter, they were sitting as a three-judge court judging a constitutional issue. The only body above that with jurisdiction is the Supreme Court of the United States.

**Ms. Boswell:** This three-judge court, though, what level would it be? Is it a District Court?

**Sen. Greive:** I've never been through anything like it before or since. I don't know, but as I understood it, it was a constitutional issue. This is a three-judge court, and the three-judge courts are almost the highest. The only place you could go is the Supreme Court of the United States if you're not satisfied, and they don't operate like the others do.

Normally, you operated in a chain. You worked your way up to the U.S. District, the District Courts, and then to the Appellate Court—the Ninth District—and from the Ninth District to the Supreme Court, but they didn't. They went from there to the United States Supreme Court.

**Ms. Boswell:** So, when Morrill introduced his plan, there wasn't any argument and you just had to accept it?

**Sen. Greive:** There were all kinds of arguments. We consumed several days of argument. We submitted briefs, and it seemed like to me we had about five hundred pages—four hundred seventy-four, four hundred eighty, four hundred and ninety-four pages or so—that were filled with all the documents and exhibits that we put in. So four hundred and ninety-four pages is a lot of pages and exhibits, plus a lot of other things that the court could call upon if they wanted to, so they could reach out. There was plenty of reading material.

**Ms. Boswell:** What were your few main arguments about?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, we had a series of arguments that we objected to. Once we made the decision to oppose the plan and show that it was unfair so that we'd get a better shake the next time, then we began to look at things. Part of the first things that we said was that blacks and other minorities are under-counted, and that the principal people who were under-counted were the soldiers who were permanent residents. Mostly that's in Fort Lewis, but it was other places, too. These are people that were stationed somewhere for a period of time and are voters in the state of Washington. They were missed.

He missed the Indians—the Indian nations. We had statements from our attorney and various people like that saying that they were under-counted, substantially under-counted, especially around Yakima where they had a better line on them.

And the other thing we went after was the blacks, and the mistakes that were made. I said one hundred forty-nine thousand, I think it was—a little mistake here, a little mistake there.

Now, these mistakes are questionable. Maybe somebody else would look at them and say, "Well, you read it differently," and say, "That isn't a mistake." But there was enough to be substantial, whether it was one hundred twenty-nine thousand, I don't know. We figured they could get around those by withdrawing it, but we didn't think they would let the mistakes go. But they let the mistakes go anyway, and nobody called them on it. The courts accepted it, but I guess it's an area where it's so hard to do, and they don't want it to come unraveled. Why, you just accept it. So, we didn't think the count was right.

We did think they had under-counted, especially the blacks, the Indians, the military personnel, and those were our attacks on them,

but we got nowhere.

**Ms. Boswell:** Now, you were joined in the attacks by the AFL-CIO. Is that fair?

**Sen. Greive:** Yes, well, it's unfair to say that we were joined. We went and sought them out. They were our natural enemies. They were interested; they were around there all the time. They were talking about it. What my attitude was is this: if you're going to become part of it, and you've got a lot more prestige than others do, you should come in. So, we were probably more encouraging is the best way to say it. They paid the lawyer, though, and they hired Borawick. I suggested him; I thought he was a good lawyer. He was the one that handled it the first time, but that doesn't mean that they had to hire him. They could have hired him if they wanted.

**Ms. Boswell:** But now, did you serve as attorney for them at all, too?

**Sen. Greive:** I was the attorney. It finally came down to where I represented—not the AFL-CIO (at one time, I did for one of the unions, but I never represented the AFL-CIO)—but in this particular instance, I became the attorney for the appellants. So I wrote the brief with considerable help from various people who assembled the material and did all that sort of thing, but I had the staff to do it—I didn't have to do it all myself. All I had to say is, "Get me this document and that document and index it," and various things like that, and they did it.

I had to get myself admitted to plead before the Supreme Court, incidentally. I went to Washington, D.C. and got myself admitted, and the next time I was in Washington, D.C., I had to go, walk up, and stand before the Court, and they admitted me. The ceremony was very brief; it was done on paper. I've got a certificate out there in the office.

I'm one of the few lawyers around who's got a certificate to show that I'm a member of the Supreme Court—not that's it's very important. I've never had a case since or before. It's an honorary thing; I think almost anybody can get it if they have to, especially if you've got a case that might be important. But I had to do it; it was a requirement, or otherwise I probably wouldn't have bothered.

**Ms. Boswell:** I didn't know you had to get special permission to argue a case there. But now, I guess I still don't understand how Borawick fits in.

**Sen. Greive:** Well, Borawick was the first person to bring in a redistricting action. He represented *Thigpen v. Meyers* in the first redistricting. He was successful, but he's also a friend of mine. He's somebody I knew and had some respect for, and he became a part of this. To the AFL-CIO, I said, "I think you should intervene." "Okay, now who do we get for a lawyer? Who would you get?" They were our allies, and so to ask me was the logical thing, and I suggested Borawick. I didn't tell them that they had to get Borawick; that's up to them. My attitude simply was that he was familiar with the material; he'd done it once successfully by himself, and who else do you get? He was, I think, a Democrat, but I don't know if he was or not. He's dead now.

**Ms. Boswell:** So, he essentially then represented the labor interest in this?

**Sen. Greive:** Yes, but in most cases we were together; in other words, any brief I put in, they were in support of it. I'd have to look at all the documents to see what they put in.; I just have the one thing here, but somewhere I've got all the documents, or I can get them down at the court in the archives. I suspect that he put his own briefs though.

**Ms. Boswell:** But then, you said that you gathered literally hundreds of pages of testimony and supporting documentation.

**Sen. Greive:** Mostly they were affidavits. There was very, very little testimony because they didn't give us a hearing. But everything was on the record, and the record was done by affidavit; it wasn't done by calling witnesses and putting them on the stand and putting them under oath. This is all done on paper.

**Ms. Boswell:** And what kind of people or who did you have give affidavits?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, it depended on what issue. If we were interested in the all-over census of Melvin Seuger—

**Ms. Boswell:** I'm sorry, who was Seuger?

**Sen. Greive:** He was the director of the census, or one of the directors of the census, in King County. We had an affidavit from Peggy Maxie—Peggy Joan Maxie was the first black woman ever elected in the Legislature. She was in the Thirty-second District, and they were cutting her district out. They hadn't counted everybody, so she put an affidavit in saying that it wasn't the correct count.

**Ms. Boswell:** Was she any relation to Carl Maxie?

**Sen. Greive:** Yes. I don't know what relation, but some relation. I don't think she was married to him at all, but he was prominent civil rights lawyer; at least that's what I remember.

Another was Sam W. Hunt, an aide to the Superintendent of Public Instruction, because he kept taking in more correlation between how many students were in class in their

district. You see, the federal government pays part of the per student cost and so they had different figures. We made comparisons and they helped; they were very helpful to point out that there were really more people—based on the number of students—in the Thirty-seventh District. They used the number of students in Pasco because they also had them by race. So, they weren't being reflected in the numbers being counted.

Now, we had George Kupka. He was a former state representative, no longer in office and therefore he was out of the fight. But he had represented the Twenty-seventh District or the Hill Top District over in Tacoma for many years, and he put one in. We had Mike Gallagher—he's an old war horse—but very knowledgeable in this manner. He'd been King County chairman, and he'd been a state senator, and he'd been a state representative. When he was in the Legislature, he was always on the Constitution and Elections Committee and he'd been chairman of it several times. So, he had an affidavit from him on some of the racial minorities and so forth and so on.

George Sheridan had been very active in various things; at one time he was a state representative, but he'd also been a county commissioner in Pierce County. When he was a county commissioner, the county was divided into three districts, and his particular county commissioner district was the one with all the minorities were in it. So, we had him give his opinion on the statistics, and he said that they left out six hundred thousand Negroes. He said about seventy percent of the people were counted and that was his doing.

And we had William Schlick. He was an attorney for the Yakima Nation, when they were the most successful tribe, at that time, probably in the state. They had a lot of farms and—you know they were something—they had a lot of land. It was reservation land that had been set aside for them, and he explained

how they hadn't counted all of the people in the tribes, and that they had different counts for different purposes.

We had Ross Young—now, Ross Young had been a statistician who was employed in various capacities around the state Legislature. He had done everything from being a doorman when he was out of power, and when he was in power, they had him as a statistician. He lived in Olympia and just liked to be around to some capacity, but he was very capable. I think he had a Master's—he certainly had a degree—he was no dummy. He wasn't just somebody that we picked up. In the Legislature, people like him were always in demand. There's a group that somehow seemed to turn up on various sides of things. Sometimes they're one way, sometimes the other, but they're people of expertise who live there and go and look for a job every session.

And then we had Pat Sutherland. Now, Pat Sutherland had been a state representative and a state senator for the Thirty-seventh District at one time, and he would eventually become the prosecuting attorney down at Thurston County. In fact, he retired and died here just shortly after, but at that particular time we used him in the capacity because he was familiar with the Thirty-seventh District and knew about the under-count.

We had Neale. Neale Chaney was the Democratic chairman for the state of Washington. We got Neale to come through and give his say that it was partisan, and talk about the political things that separated it.

Those are the type of people that we had, so you can see that every one of these people is partisan—I'm not trying to say that we were nonpartisan—but they were people with expertise. When you go to court and you bring your experts, they don't expect you to bring experts that you don't agree with. Every one of them would qualify. Now, were they prejudiced? Well, they may have been Democratic-oriented because that's who I'd

get. I'm sure that we had affidavits from Joe Davis and some other people, too.

**Ms. Boswell:** Al Rosellini, I think.

**Sen. Greive:** Rosellini, but we had those because they were big names in their own right. Generally, they commented on broader things. We also had a number of people whose names were instantly recognizable because they took a part in the process. For instance, we had Albert Rosellini. We had Joe Davis; we had AFL-CIO people. We had Graham who'd been a state Democratic chairman, and we had people who were openly partisan.

We called them just to show that the Democrats were united. Probably the most important person that we had was Steve Cough. Steve knew more than anyone about it; he knew more about that land than the maps and actually ran the drawing and ran the crew and so forth and so on. He had two or three affidavits in, but we felt he was an expert. Rosellini and Davis—they were much broader. So, we had a good team, and they didn't put any experts on to contest us. It wasn't like we had to fight with them. They just ignored it—the attorney general and Prince.

**Ms. Boswell:** And then some of them testified about the apparent partisanship or inequities, and even about the way the master had divided up the districts?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, the master didn't do a very good job of redistricting, that's all. He may be a professor of geography, and I think, given enough time, he might have done a better job. He took on a job that I'm sure boggled his mind a little, and he wanted to show how he could get it done in a hurry—how he could do it this way and that way. I don't think that he sat down and studied, except in a few cases, mine or somebody else's. He might have done

that, but I don't think he was anxious to just fine-tune the whole thing. He knew things; that is, you lived in certain areas that were along the water if you were Republicans. He knew that where the "Gold Coasts" were, and he knew the general characteristics. He would know where the blacks would live, and he knew where the military would live. He was a geographer; he knew those things.

**Ms. Boswell:** But, just this one example: your own district, as opposed to the Speaker of the House's district, was strangely apportioned, wasn't it?

**Sen. Greive:** Yes.

**Ms. Boswell:** Can you tell me about that?

**Sen. Greive:** Now, did you put that on the record already?

**Ms. Boswell:** No. We haven't talked about that yet.

**Sen. Greive:** Well, then stop for a minute until I find it. The Democratic chairman is talking about the unfairness of the plan.

**Ms. Boswell:** This is Neale Chaney. This is an affidavit and I'm just going to read a short portion of it. He says:

*That in the districts of the two most prominent leaders in the Legislative redistricting effort—the majority leader of the Senate, who is a Democrat, and the Speaker of the House, who is a Republican—the master showed gross favoritism for the Republican. For instance, the Speaker of the House, part of his district is in Tacoma. But he has recently moved to the peninsula area across the Narrows Bridge, which is also in his present district, so that the Republican attorney general made a special plea that his district be kept*

*intact—which was done by the master, even though his new district will be separated by Puget Sound. When it came to the Democratic leader, Senator Greive, however, his district has for forty years had a river running through it, an industrial section of the district. Requests were made by the interveners, the AFL-CIO, and Senator Cooney that Senator Greive's district be left intact. But the master not only used the Duwamish River as a border but brought the district down along the Republican-leaning "Gold Coast," something that no plan proposed by either Democrats or Republicans had done.*

**Sen. Greive:** That brought it along the coast; it meant that it was stair-stepped in degrees, and the river was along with the border then.

**Ms. Boswell:** So, there appeared, at least to some, to be some favoritism in this redistricting, even though the master was supposed to be neutral?

**Sen. Greive:** Oh, I think that there was gross favoritism; I didn't know, no question about that. They displaced a lot of the city people, but I suppose that's old hat now. Those people are dead and gone.

**Ms. Boswell:** In getting these affidavits, did you provide information to these people?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, we probably drew up the affidavits, if you want to know the truth, but that's no different than you do in court. By now, I can say that I practiced law for over forty-five years, and you go out and get your expert, you talk over the facts and so forth. You expect them to write it, and some cases—like Neale Chaney or somebody—they might be willing to write it, but normally the experts want you to write it, and they'll correct it and change it. Now, once in a while you get somebody that's so technical only he can write



it, or she can write it; then they do it. It was a standard procedure.

In any event, it was something that was read several times by whoever signed it. We didn't just automatically sign it; we took our time with it and explained it. We'd have two or three sessions with them, often. I don't know how many, I can't remember at this point how many we had. The information we had, for instance, when it was statistical information, it was a good chance that the expert didn't actually look the statistics up. He took the statistics from us. The important thing was that this is submitted in court, if you're worried about that in the first place. The second place is the other side is going to read it with a fine-tooth comb. They didn't submit any documents in opposition, so I'd presume what we said was correct. In fact, I'm sure I'm right.

**Ms. Boswell:** But the judge—what did the judge do with the information?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, there were three judges.

**Ms. Boswell:** The three judges, then?

**Sen. Greive:** They did just what the master proposed. We didn't have a chance; they just adopted it.

**Ms. Boswell:** So, they adopted Morrill's plan?

**Sen. Greive:** They prevented us from making arguments, but then that didn't do us any good. They made up their mind; they just adopted it, and they were done with it. We had to appeal to the appellate court, and the appellate court in this case was the United States Supreme Court.

**Ms. Boswell:** So, tell me about that experience.

**Sen. Greive:** Well, we got it all down on paper. They refused to hear the case. We made an application to be put on the docket, and we submitted all our materials to the judges, asking one of them to certify us and to put us on the docket. We didn't make the docket so the decision stood. But they had lots of material; both sides submitted material on that. The attorney general, I believe—I can't remember now—but I think he supported the Morrill plan.

**Ms. Boswell:** That would have been Slade Gorton?

**Sen. Greive:** Yes.

**Ms. Boswell:** So, once they adopted Morrill's plan, then that was it?

**Sen. Greive:** That was it, and I'm convinced that initially the Republicans had a real tough reaction. They lost control of the Senate or the House.

**Ms. Boswell:** Why do you think that happened?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, I think I got it the next time because I wasn't up that year. I think the public had it up to here with redistricting. I thought that they believed one more time that we were partisan, that we were bickering, and that we were small children, whatever. I always thought that even when we were doing it. I always felt that every redistricting would be the last session I'd ever serve. I used to say that; well, I figured I'm not going to survive—I'm surprised I survived them.

**Ms. Boswell:** Why did you keep doing it then?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, because I thought I had to. You can't be the leader and not take on the unpleasant tasks. You don't give away the

ship. It was my job. I knew about it; I was interested in it. I'd done it once, and once I'd done it, why—see, the first time we had to for self-preservation. They just knocked us all out, including me. So when I did that, why there was only one nominee; nobody else wanted the job.

Now, somebody like McCormack came up with a plan of his own because he thought it was some publicity or something like that, and he'd taken an interest—but initially he didn't take an interest. They'd only taking interest, once they had seen—see, once we'd done the statistical work and they could see what we'd done—how things were comparably easy for somebody to make another plan. They had places to check and information had to be gathered, so McCormack or somebody wanted to make a plan. He was Congressman McCormack by this time. He served in both houses of the Legislature, but he became a congressman after what I'm talking about. When he made a plan, he could go down there, and we'd get him any material we had. He could study the records because we had all the redistricting records. Anybody could have them. So then he could make his plan, but he was never able to get the Republicans.

**Ms. Boswell:** I'm sorry. You had another point you wanted to make about the candidates.

**Sen. Greive:** When we would be negotiating with the Republicans, why they would make concessions and we'd always wonder what the motive was behind the concession. The concession was—there were several people who were rumored not to be interested in running in the Legislature again, who wanted to run for Congress. One was Thomas Swayze, so if they made a concession that affected Swayze or anything, why they weren't really giving anything away. Another was Bud Pardini; he's a Spokane Republican coming up. Stewart Bledsoe wasn't going to run again.

He ran for Congress and lost. Tom Copeland. He was always rumored to run for something else. He was interested in higher office or something—Lieutenant Governor and that sort of thing.

And so we always laughed when they came up with somebody who got hurt, and they'd tell us how hard that was and how important that person was. We'd always call them "congressman." We called them Congressman Bledsoe, Congressman Swayze, Congressman Copeland. Isn't that when Copeland tried several times to get back in as the county councilman or county commissioner over there, but never had been able to make it again? Although he's rich and so forth, he kind of had the style they don't like, apparently.

**Ms. Boswell:** Now, you had brought up—and then we got sidetracked—that you might have had something more to say to about the census itself and what happened.

**Sen. Greive:** Well, what we found out or were told was that this was the first time they ever had this mail-back business.

**Ms. Boswell:** I'm sorry, what is that?

**Sen. Greive:** They didn't go door-to-door and question and talk to these people. They had a mail-back situation. The whole census is now a mail-back, but this is early on.

**Ms. Boswell:** Oh, this is 1970.

**Sen. Greive:** And at that time they tried to do the black areas, but they said the people were so afraid to go there at night. They couldn't get any people willing to go take the census in the black area at night in the Thirty-seventh District, and so they decided to work a mail-back system. And that's why they did it. That accounts for the dramatic differences in the

number of people that were counted there. That's one reason; another reason why the census was inaccurate is that there were a certain number of people who worried about child support or other things that didn't want to be known. Just leave and not have to be identified as being some place. That accounts for another thing, so there were a number of reasons.

In the Indians' case, I don't know why they missed them because the federal government had to supply them money for the Indian census. They should have known, but there were complicated reasons as to why the errors remained. You have to read the affidavits to know, but I don't know at this point if they're of any great importance.

**Ms. Boswell:** But, so there's the issue of under-counting—the first issue of under-representation—that the numbers they're basing all this on in the first place are not correct?

**Sen. Greive:** Yes. That's one hundred forty-some thousand people—at least that's what Ross Young said. He was working on the staff, and I told him that was his job to go through and recheck everything.

**Ms. Boswell:** Then there's another issue, too, that's there's partisanship in terms of how they're drawn. And for the black community, the way the Central District was carved up diluted any power that they might have as a block of voters, is that right?

**Sen. Greive:** That's right; that would be one of them. I don't know if that was true, but it was always a given that they were going to be Democrats, and we had more Democrats to split out. Of course, it's just like having the Gold Coast—you know you have more Republicans. You have more Republicans coming out of the district.

**Ms. Boswell:** But you could add Democrats and possibly change the vote of a district? In another sense, it could dilute the numbers so that they were overwhelmed by other people?

**Sen. Greive:** Not only that, I pointed out one case where they stretched the district—and I think this was a Republican plan, not the master's plan—I forget. But what you do is, you could eliminate people by just putting them in the same district. You could do it another way; you could do them in by putting them in districts, senatorial districts, that are not where they live. In other words, if you've got a district representative that is up for re-election, and you move the number somewhere else, they've got to sit the election out because they're no longer eligible when you've changed the number to another district. See, if the Fifth District has its two senators and one has two years to go in his term and you move the Fifth District from Spokane to Seattle, for instance, why, then they'd be without representation. So, you'd have two senators left in what was the Fifth District, but only one of them could survive; there's only one spot. So those are the techniques that we used.

**Ms. Boswell:** Then you believed that, ultimately, the fallout over this final redistricting plan would hurt the Republicans, but you later became a casualty of it, too, to a degree?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, I became a casualty by a very close vote, yes. I worked at it; it wasn't like I didn't campaign. I just had the feeling that my district had had enough of me. You know, you think you're popular, but they get down on you for some reason and what are you going to do? You do your best. You can fight back. I had all kinds of coffee hours, put up the campaign signs, the ads, and all that sort of thing. They elected my replacement,

Nancy Buffington. She served only one term in the Legislature; she got married and didn't come back. She is a very delightful woman, but she didn't have to win the election. They voted against me in 1974; they didn't vote for her.

**Ms. Boswell:** And did that surprise you at the time?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, I was surprised. I think, when you get into a campaign, you always think you're going to win. Your optimism is something you can't get rid of and I was stunned and that sort of thing. But I think, in looking back on it, that's all right. Probably did me a favor—my constituents put me in the King County Council where I got a lot better retirement. It goes by your high years.

**Ms. Boswell:** But at the time, how would you describe your feelings when you found out?

**Sen. Greive:** I felt rejected; I had never lost an election up till then. I run in the same place, you see my district—it varied—sometimes it went downtown, sometimes it went over the hump to Lake Skyway and that area right up to Renton. Sometimes it went south to Federal Way. West Seattle was a peninsula and so it was difficult to join with others areas. So, wherever West Seattle went, I went.

I was born and raised here and I felt very bad about it and you always do when you lose. But in the Legislature, it was probably a good thing. Besides, I had enough of redistricting. I thought at times of becoming a consultant for redistricting and things like that because many states have problems, but I always felt I'm better off not getting involved in it anymore.

**Ms. Boswell:** In retrospect, were you sorry you did get involved?

**Sen. Greive:** No. It was just like a job. Plumbers make a lot of money, but they've got a miserable job. There are miserable aspects of almost every job. For instance, I have some rentals and people play loud music late at night. I've got to go tell them they can't do it, and this is just a part of the job. If I were the floor leader and didn't look out for the people, I wouldn't be doing my job. I used to feel that I was not just a legislator, but I also was a business agent for the people. There's no other way to do it, or you can't look out for them.

**Ms. Boswell:** To a degree, isn't there sort of a Catch 22 in redistricting? You know as majority leader, you did have to represent the rest of the Democrats. On the other hand, you know you had to get redistricting passed, and it had to be as bipartisan as possible. So, on the one hand you have to be partisan because that's your job; on the other hand, you have to be bipartisan because it won't get through if you're not. So, how do you balance it?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, what you're having is constant contacts—just constant contact—and millions of words, just million of words, get said. And you do some of it right when everybody is listening—all the people in the caucus. Some of it you do just by sitting down and putting your arm around them and talking it over, seeing what they have to give, seeing if there's another way. A lot of times you give it straight. You say, "Here's our problem. Now, can you come up with a solution?" So they'd go away and try to work this way or that way and then they'd come back. "Well, I'd like this district better." You'd try to see how it affected the others to see if you could live with it.

Such a slow process, but we sort of worked it out. It worked itself out; we didn't have to dramatically cut people's throats. We had to get a majority vote anyway, but it got too

partisan. One thing I can say in reading this material that you got, and the newspaper articles which I hadn't ever seen before, is that I don't think I was treated too unfairly with the press. I think they understood I was trying to do the best I could, too. But I was constantly afraid of it.

**Ms. Boswell:** Now ultimately, did the courts take redistricting out of the hands of the Legislature?

**Sen. Greive:** No, they didn't. The people did it.\*

**Ms. Boswell:** Explain that process to me.

**Sen. Greive:** Well, I don't know too much about it because I never lived under it, but they set up a bipartisan commission with so many Democrats appointed and so many Republicans appointed. The chairman is non-partisan, and they have to do the job.

It is probably a better way of doing it, although I'm sure they have the same problems we did. Only, it's intense. I think the best way in the world would be to let the Legislature do it because they know the most about it, and they have the most to gain or to lose. However, it's an awfully difficult thing to do if the legislators do it. Their plans always look better than the ones that the master or somebody else does. If some outsider does it,

they don't go into all the details. We always worried how square they looked, how neatly they looked on the sheet. We were worried if we violated the idea of natural borders. We worried about a whole lot of things that maybe they don't have to worry so much about because they don't just want to get it done—it's going to pass.

That doesn't mean the Legislature doesn't have a shot at it, but by then it's pretty well done. They do have to submit it to both Houses. But, if I was in that position, I could do it pretty easily, too. It was the partisanship, the idea of somebody's plan affecting you or your friend. It was an opportunity for someone to use his leverage, a convenient place to put his arm around somebody's shoulder that needs your vote. Everybody won't become absolutely essential unless you have a big lopsided majority.

**Ms. Boswell:** And you never really had that during these years.

**Sen. Greive:** No, and then you got a lot of people that loved to be the final vote on anything. They were the votes you needed the most, and at the end they could bargain for all kinds of little things that were important to them but not maybe to everybody else. If it was an interesting process, you haven't gone through it—that's all I can say.

*\*Editor's Note: In 1983, the Legislature passed Senate Joint Resolution 103, which gave redistricting power to an independent bipartisan commission. The joint resolution was then put to a vote of the people on November 8, 1983, and was passed, thereby amending the Washington State constitution to allow for redistricting by commission.*